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Edward J. Larson*
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FORCED EXIT: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM ASSISTED SUICIDE TO
LEGALIZED MURDER. By Wesley J. Smith. Dallas: Spence Publ'g Co.

2003. Pp. xxii, 364. Paper, $17.95.

Nearly 170 years ago, in the classic first volume of his Democracy
in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "Scarcely any political

question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or
later, into a judicial question. "1 De Tocqueville viewed this as a
peculiarly U.S. development. He attributed it to the authority of the
judiciary in the United States to review governmental enactments and
establish individual rights based on judicial interpretation of the
federal and state constitution. "Whenever a law that the judge holds to
be unconstitutional is invoked in a tribunal of the United States, he
may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is the only one peculiar to
the U.S. magistrate, but it give rise to immense political influence, " de
Tocqueville explained.2 He then commented, "But as soon as a judge
has refused to apply any given law in a case, that law immediately
loses a portion of its moral force. "3 The same can be said of individual
rights: those decreed by the Supreme Court carry added moral force,
those denied by that Court carry less moral force. To some extent,
Americans conflate morality with constitutionality. The relevance of
this observation in a review of two books about efforts to legalize
physician-assisted death, Ian Dowbiggin's4 A Merciful End and Wesley
* Talmadge Professor of Law and Russell Professor of History, University of Georgia.
B.A. 1974, Williams College; M.A., 1976, Ph.D., 1984, University of Wisconsin-Madison;
J.D., 1979, Harvard. - Ed.

1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1945).
2.

Id.

at 101.

3. Id. at 102.
4. Professor of History, University of Prince Edward Island.
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J. Smith's5 Forced Exit, should become apparent later - but for now,
permit me to elaborate on the general observation.
Of course, de Tocqueville's equation of the constitutional, the
political, and the moral does not apply in every case. In his majority
opinion in the 1857 Dred Scott case, Chief Justice Roger Taney
articulated a constitutional right for citizens who legally owned slaves
under state law to take that "property" into United States territories
where slavery was outlawed under federal or territorial statutes.6 He
did this with the hope of resolving the most pressing political and
moral question of his day in favor of the extension of slavery into
supposedly free territories. The attempt backfired badly as free-soil
moderates joined radical abolitionists in denouncing the Court and its
ruling. For example, Illinois trial lawyer Abraham Lincoln attributed
the judicial decision to the ruling Democratic political dynasty in
Washington, and called for the people "to meet and overthrow the
power of that dynasty" to prevent it from pushing its pro-slavery
agenda through the courts.7 After he was elected president in 1860 at
least in part on his promise to roll back Dred Scott, Southern
Democrats pushed their states to secede from the Union. The ballot
box and the battle field (rather than constitutional adjudication)
ultimately resolved that particular political and moral question, 8 with
the 13th Amendment effectively overruling Dred Scott in 1865.
Dred Scott is more the exception than the rule, however.
Throughout our nation's history, many hotly contested political issues
were resolved, without conflict, by judicial decisions. Three examples
spanning the past half-century illustrate the rule. Following a virtual
tie in Florida that left no clear winner in the 2000 presidential election,
Bush v. Gore9
despite deep and continuing objections to the case in
-

5. Attorney and popular writer.
6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857).
7. Abraham Lincoln,

A House Divided: Speech Delivered at Springfield, Illinois, at the
Close of the Republican State Convention (June 16, 1856), in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
AMERICAN LITERATURE 1587 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 5th ed. 1998).

8. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 691, 715-16 (2004) ("It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Civil War
repudiated the notion that the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements are binding
on all other actors in our constitutional system, but not by very much. Lincoln campaigned
against the binding nature of Dred Scott, other than as a rule of decision for the parties in
that particular case. He campaigned against popular acquiescence in a potential "Second
Dred Scott" opinion that might confirm and extend the original, and introduce a requirement
that Northern states tolerate slavery within their borders. In a very real sense, Lincoln's
election constituted an electoral rejection of the Supreme Court's supremacy in matters of
constitutional law. The South's attempted secession was a rejection of the validity of that
electoral rejection and of the constitutional views of the North more generally. Lincoln's
rejection of secession, in turn, rejected the legitimacy of the South's constitutional
objections. And so the issue was joined, and would be determined on the battlefield.").
9. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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many quarters - effectively decided the political question of who
became president in 2001. Al Gore accepted the Court's majority
opinion as final and his partisans did not take to the streets in protest
- as perhaps might have happened in countries with a different
attitude toward judicial power. Another example occurred a quarter
century earlier, when, after months of resisting judicial and
congressional subpoenas, President Richard Nixon complied with the
Supreme Court's order in United States v. Nixon10 directing him to tum
over the so-called Watergate tapes to the Watergate special
prosecutor. This led to Nixon's resignation from office two weeks
later. Here, as in Gore, political questions were resolved by judicial
decisions. In a yet earlier example, President Dwight Eisenhower sent
federal troops into the Deep South to enforce federal court orders
decreeing the desegregation of public schools, despite his personal
objections to those rulings. He thereby gave teeth to the enforcement
of the Court's pronouncements in Brown v. Board of Education.11
Together, those judicial pronouncements and the resultant executive
actions led to the end of de jure segregation in public education, which
was arguably the most difficult political and moral question of the
1950s.
As a political and moral question in the United States, euthanasia
may not rise to the same historic level of significance as school
desegregation or the abolition of slavery, but during the 1990s, as A
Merciful End and Forced Exit show, it commanded considerable
public attention. Best-selling books, articles, and television programs
promoted the concept of mercy killing to a wide audience (Smith, pp.
12-35). Activist groups supporting the legalization of physician
assisted suicide or medical eutl:).anasia, such as the Hemlock Society
and Compassion in Dying, sprang up and gained visibility (Smith, p.
172; Dowbiggin, p. 162). Bills on the topic surfaced in state legislatures
around the country and voters in five states faced ballot initiatives to
legalize physician-assisted suicide, with one of them, the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act, passing by a 51% to 49% margin in 1994
(Dowbiggin, pp. 167-71).12 In New York and Washington State,
concerned physicians and patients filed suits in federal court to
overturn state statutes against assisting suicide.13
As those lawsuits wound their way to the United States Supreme
Court in 1997,1 4 they became the focal point of the political and moral
10. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. In addition to Oregon in 1994, the other four states were Washington (1991),
California (1992), Michigan (1998), and Maine (2000).
13. At least in so far as those laws prohibited physicians from honoring requests from
competent, terminally ill patients for aid in dying. Smith, pp. 161-68.
14. Vacco

v.

Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).

1248

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:1245

debate over euthanasia in the United States. When the Court handed
down its decision refusing to recognize a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, the entire issue largely
disappeared from the headlines. The political debate subsided
virtually overnight. This occurred despite the fact that the justices both·in the majority and concurring opinions - expressly reserved the
matter to resolution through state political processes and did not even
purport to have resolved the constitutional issue for all time.15
Although A Merciful End and the revised and updated edition of
Forced Exit were published in 2003, they contain surprisingly little
about the Supreme Court's 1997 decisions in Glucksburg and Quill.
Although A Merciful End purports to cover the history of the
euthanasia movement in the United States from roughly 1900 to "the
1990s and beyond" (Dowbiggin, p. 163), it relegates this final period to
a cursory concluding chapter. Forced Exit is not history. It is written in
the present tense, but was first published in 1997 (before the Supreme
Court rulings). Revisions for the 2003 edition did not alter the book's
basic style and substance. Smith made little effort to integrate the
Supreme Court rulings into his critique of physician-assisted suicide,
perhaps because they did not neatly fit his slippery-slope analysis.
These two books tell us much about the public debate before the
Supreme Court rulings, but little about those rulings or their
aftermath. In this review, I will summarize and comment on both
books as well as the Supreme Court's opinions in Glucksburg and
Quill.

I.

A MERCIFUL END

The misappropriately (or perhaps ironically) titled book, A
Merciful End, is a history of the euthanasia movement in the United

States that portrays its leaders as only secondarily interested in
providing a merciful end for suffering patients. Instead, Dowbiggin
presents a picture of a movement with deep social Darwinian and
eugenic currents (Dowbiggin, p. 16). Even for those leaders of the
euthanasia movement whose concerns centered on the suffering
patient rather than society, Dowbiggin implies that the fruit of their
labor may be infected by mistake, abuse, and short-sightedness
(Dowbiggin, pp. 155-56 (case of Dax Cowert), pp. 164-69 (cases of
Nancy Cruzan, "Debbie," and Janet Adkins)).
Although euthanasia has long roots in Western culture, Dowbiggin
begins his account around 1990, during the heyday of social
Darwinism and the dawn of eugenics. The book's subtitle - "The

15. Washington
concurring).

v.

Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997);

id.

at 788-89 (Souter, J.,
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Euthanasia Movement in Modem America" - is more descriptive of
the book's contents than its title. Euthanasia is revealed to be a very
modem way of dying. Dowbiggin depicts the utilitarian, anticlerical,
pervasively Darwinian euthanasia movement as an archetypical
manifestation of the modem reform impulse. Fittingly, the movement
begins in The United States around the tum of the Twentieth Century
with champions like Progressive political orator Robert Ingersoll,
Ethical Culture movement founder Felix Adler, and popular socialist
author Jack London. These and other Progressive Era champions of
euthanasia saw suicide as a rational choice for the terminally ill, and
mercy killing as appropriate for those suffering severe physical or
mental disabilities (Dowbiggin, pp. .155-56). Dowbiggin's account
suggests that the United States' failure to embrace their arguments for
euthanasia reflects a cultural hesitancy to accept the full implications
of rational modernity, which is characterized by a naturalistic,
utilitarian view of life. Perhaps there is some sentiment and
superstition left in us, at least when confronted with death.
A Merciful End is fundamentally a work of institutional history,
and it is the well-researched story of the Euthanasia Society of
America (the "ESA") and successor organizations that the book tells
in impressive detail. After chronicling the emergence during the
Progressive Era of early calls for legalizing euthanasia, Dowbiggin hits
his stride through his description of ESA's founding during the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Charles Francis Potter, a Baptist minister
turned radical secularist who founded the New York City Humanist
Society, and Ann Mitchell, a New York heiress who Dowbiggin
describes as psychologically "unstable," served as the driving force
behind the ESA, at least until Potter resigned as ESA president in
1938 due to inadequate pay and Mitchell jumped from a window to
her death in 1942 (Dowbiggin, pp. 36-54). Dowbiggin includes such
tidbits of ESA history to show the character of its leaders. Potter and
Mitchell warmly endorsed eugenics and advocated euthanasia for both
the disabled and the terminally ill. As Dowbiggin documents in detail,
the small, Manhattan-based organization's boards and councils were
dominated by an elite corps of eugenicists, including modernist
minister Henry Emerson Fosdick, progressive sociologist Edward A.
Ross, psychologist H. H. Goddard, biologist Arthur Estabrook, birth
control advocate Margaret Sanger, and geneticist C. C. Little
(Dowbiggin, p. 54).
After a promising start in the 1930s, the euthanasia movement fell
on hard times during the 1940s. During the 1930s and early 1940s, the
Nazi government in Germany had systematically euthanized large
numbers of sick or infirm patiems in addition to implementing their
final solution for Jews, and Dowbiggin places some of the blame on
Germans who supported euthanasia before the war, "no matter what
their intentions" <Dowbiggin, pp. 67-71). Linking euthanasia to Nazism
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discredited the practice in the United States, especially after the
United States joined the war against Germany in 1941. Illustrating just
how out of step Potter fell from popular opinion as the United States
turned against the scientific materialism that characterized Nazi
Germany, he actually suggested legalizing euthanasia to provide a
"merciful release" for disabled veterans returning from World War
Two (Dowbiggin, pp. 72-73). By examining the eugenic, utilitarian
thinking of early ESA leaders and equating it to the reasoning of
German physicians whose support for euthanasia helped lay the
foundations for the Nazi death camps, Dowbiggin presents mercy
killing for some (at least as conceived during the 1930s) as a slippery
slope leading all too predictably to fatal results for many.
Virtually without support in the 1950s, the U.S. euthanasia
movement revived in the 1960s and 1970s with a revised agenda. The
paramount message became the autonomy of suffering, terminally ill
patients to decide when and how their lives should end (Dowbiggin,
pp. 97-98). Certainly the advent of life-sustaining treatments spurred
the quest for greater patient control, but Dowbiggin ties revived
interest in euthanasia more to cultural than to medical developments
<nowbiggin, pp. 110-18>· Individuals simply expected greater control
over their bodies; and this shift in public opinion gave new life to the
euthanasia movement. Episcopal theologian Joseph Fletcher, an
influential proponent of situational ethics, emerged as a leader within
the ESA. Aligning itself with these cultural developments, in 1974 the
organization also changed its name from the old-fashioned sounding
Euthanasia Society of America, replete with Nazi implications, to the
more liberal-sounding Society for the Right to Die, in tune with the
individual-rights ethos of late twentieth-century America. Showing a
similar concern for semantics, its sister organization, the Euthanasia
Education Fund, became Concern for Dying soon after. These
organizations gradually changed their focus from championing state
sponsored euthanasia to advocating living wills and physician aid in
dying - although Fletcher remained an old-line eugenicist who saw
social benefit in selective mercy killing (Dowbiggin, pp. 100-18). As
they changed, he gradually lost influence within them. During the 1980s
and early 1990s, Derek Humphry's Hemlock Society and Jack
Kevorkian's shock tactics championed some of the ESA's more radical
positions as the ESA's own successors moved toward the middle
(Dowbiggin, pp. 149, 154, 165-67).
A Merciful End tracks these historical developments with a critic's
eye for details highlighting the elitist or eugenic roots for a movement
that now presents itself as promoting individual rights and patient
autonomy. Dowbiggin is a historian of medicine, however, not a
journalist or lawyer. He all but drops the narrative with the passage of
the Oregon Death With Dignity Act in 1994. Readers more interested
in current legal developments than the history of a social movement
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should be forewarned - Dowbiggin's book barely mentions the
Supreme Court rulings in Quill and Glucksberg, devoting less than a
paragraph to those two signal cases before concluding the account a
scant three pages later <Dowbiggin, p. 173). It tells us nothing of their
impact on the ongoing debate, and leaves the reader with the dire
warning that "the floodgates dreaded by the anti-euthanasia forces
may swing wide open at some point in the not too distant future"
(Dowbiggin, p. 176).
In the book's concluding paragraph, Dowbiggin throws his lot in
with those anti-euthanasia forces. Current proponents of euthanasia
may be well-meaning, he writes, and speak of their deep commitment
to relieve human suffering. "However, the history of euthanasia in
America suggest this is a simplistic diagnosis of a gravely complex
social, political, economic, and cultural matter," Dowbiggin concludes.
"Talk of a right to die raises the troubling questions: once legalized for
the dying, who can be denied such a right?" Once granted to some,
many infirm, depressed, or simply suicidal persons might claim it too,
he fears, and parents or other surrogate decisionmakers might demand
it on behalf of minors or other incompetents. Further, Dowbiggin
worries that, once a legal right to die is established, the infirm and
disabled might feel obligated to exercise that right to lessen the
burden that they impose on society and family members. "Where does
the freedom to die end and the duty to die begin?" he asks (Dowbiggin,
pp. 176-77). These are slippery-slope questions of the type that
University of Michigan legal scholar Yale Kamisar has posed with
great force against the legalization of euthanasia for nearly fifty
years.1 6 A Merciful End provides a rich historical context for
considering these critical questions in light of how past proponents of
euthanasia conceptualized the issue. Dowbiggin shows that many
leaders of the euthanasia movement in the United States favored a
broad right to die and that some acknowledged at least a limited social
duty to die in certain circumstances. Their reasoning led in that
direction. At least for now, however, the legal limits against assisted
suicide and euthanasia have held firm against the best arguments that
euthanasia enthusiasts could muster.
16. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy
Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958); Yale Kamisar, The Rise and Fall of the
"Right" to Assisted Suicide, in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE RIGHT TO
END-OF-LIFE CARE 69-93 (Kathleen & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002). In 1994 Kamisar wrote:
Why should the non-terminal nature of a person's suffering disqualify her as a candidate for
assisted suicide? If personal autonomy and the termination of suffering are the key factors
fueling the right to assisted suicide, how can we exclude those with non-terminal illnesses or
disabilities who might have to endure greater suffering over a much longer period of time?
Why should a quadriplegic or a person afflicted with severe arthritis have to continue to live
what she considers an intolerable existence for a number of years? Why doesn't such a
person have an equal claim - or even a greater one - to assisted suicide?
Yale Kamisar,

After Assisted Suicide, What Next?, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 26.
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FORCED EXIT

Where A Merciful End looks to the history of the euthanasia
movement, Forced Exit focuses on its present manifestation, at least as
author Wesley J. Smith viewed it in 1997, when he initially published
the book. In 1994, Oregon passed its Death With Dignity Act, enacted
as a voter initiative to authorize physicians to prescribe lethal drugs in
certain cases to their competent, terminally ill patients. In 1996, two
federal appellate courts held that the due process or equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide.1 7 To Smith, it seemed as if the media were
promoting physician-assisted suicide as well. Smith wrote Forced Exit
in response to a friend's suicide after discovering that the friend had
been encouraged by literature from Hemlock Society. His purpose in
writing the book was to expose the slippery-slope-type dangers posed
by physician-assisted suicide and denounce the legal and cultural in
roads the euthanasia movement had made in recent years (Smith, pp.
xviii-xxix).
A lawyer and writer of popular, advocacy-oriented books,
including four with consumer advocate Ralph Nader, Smith's Forced
Exit assaults physician-assisted suicide much like Nader's Unsafe at
Any Speed18 assaulted Corvairs - with a drumbeat of emotional
examples and frightening facts aimed at a popular audience. The
book's subtitle summarizes its argument: "The Slippery Slope from
Assisted Suicide to Legalized Murder." As Smith presents it, this
slippery slope is a greased slide. Even though the Supreme Court in
Glicksburg and Quill reversed the two appellate court decisions
(Smith, p. 168 (addition to 2003 edition)), no state has followed
Oregon's lead in legalizing physician-assisted suicide (Smith, pp. 26465 (addition to 2003 edition)), and media attention to the issue has
lessened, the 2003 edition of Forced Exit is as shrill as the 1997 edition.
Smith has added a paragraph here or a sentence there to reflect
intervening developments, but the substance remains the same. He has
neither deleted nor rewritten anything of significance from the 1997
text.
A vitriolic, two-part thesis runs through Forced Exit from the first
to the last page. As Smith sees it, legally allowing patients of any
particular type (such as the terminally ill or the severely disabled)
either to die or to choose death represents a societal decision to
discount the value of those persons. He fears that once some are
viewed as expendable, others will be as well. He sets the tone in
17. Compassion in Dying v. State, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (due process); Quill
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (equal protection).

v.

18. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).
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Chapter One by linking the current "euthanasia consciousness"

(Smith, p. 18) to the "quality-of-life ethic" espoused by Princeton
University ethicist Peter Singer, whose 1994 book Rethinking Life and
Death19 Smith damns as "the Mein Kampf of the euthanasia
movement" (Smith, p. 25).

In Chapter Two, Smith pushes his thesis though case studies. He
tells the stories of four severely cognitively disabled patients, including
Nancy Cruzan, who, during the late 1980s or early 1990s, became the
subject of highly publicized legal battles over the termination of
artificially administered nutrition and hydration (or food and fluid)
<smith, pp. 53-56>. None of these patients could speak to request the
termination of treatment. Family members purported to speak for
them. Smith presents these patients as victims of a legal system that
allowed others to decide their fate. He titles the chapter, "Disposable
People." It concludes with the warning, "The food and fluids cases
have desensitized people to medical killing, leading to wider
application of induced death as the answer to 'serious maladies"
(Smith, p. 80). Smith claims that "the dehydration cases have been
used as a springboard for arguments to legalize euthanasia and
assisted suicide for the many" <smith, p. 80). Here is the slippery-slope
argument pushed back by Smith to indict an earlier, generally settled
legal precedent, articulated in Cruzan v. Director2° and elsewhere,
holding that severely disabled or terminally ill patients have a
constitutional right to refuse life-prolonging nutrition and hydration
either themselves or through a surrogate acting on their behalf. Rather
than see this right as affirming a person's autonomy in medical
decisionmaking, Smith condemns it as denying the patient's human
worth by allowing them to die by discontinuing food and fluids.2 1
Depending on the particular case, either view could be valid - but
Cruzan seemingly settled the matter in favor of autonomy in 1990, by
which time most states had enacted some statutory procedures for
individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment, including artificially
administered nutrition and hydration.22
Chapter Three recounts the horrors of Nazi euthanasia practices,
which began in 1939 with the killing of severely handicapped

19. PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE
TRADITIONAL ETHICS (1994).

AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE

OF

OUR

20. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
21. In the course of discussing these cases, Smith writes, "Once we accept the idea that
some lives are not worth living, once we come to see as proper the intentional ending of lives
of the profoundly disabled, once we claim the right to judge who should live and die on the
basis of subjective standards such as happiness, quality of life, or dignity, we have created a
disposable caste." Pp. 71-72.
22. See Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to Die" in
the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1300-1318 (1991).
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newborns but quickly spread to include some mentally and physically
disabled adults and other so-called "useless eaters" (Smith, pp. 84-97).
In accord with the chapter's title, "Everything Old Is New Again,"
Smith proceeds to argue that the United States is sliding in the same
direction, using as evidence selected quotes from Judge Steven
Reinhardt's 1996 majority opinion in the Ninth Circuit decision
finding a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.23
Attempting to show parallels in their reasoning, Smith sets
Reinhardt's statements against those of early proponents of the
German euthanasia program (Smith, pp. 100-02). This is an untenable
jump. Reinhardt was addressing the compelling case of conscious,
terminally-ill, pain-racked patients who knowingly request a
physician's aid in dying; the Nazi euthanasia program disposed of the
disabled without their consent based on social considerations. The two
are fundamentally different.
Having presented the two extremes - the right to refuse life
sustaining medical treatment and the Nazi gas chambers - the
ensuing chapters attempt to fill in the connecting links. There are
chapters on the ongoing Dutch experiment with legalized medical
euthanasia (highlighting how that program has, despite legal
guidelines to the contrary, expanded beyond consenting, terminally ill
adults), the effort to legalize physician-assisted suicide in various
states within the United States, the supposed financial incentives
within the United States' healthcare system that might encourage the
practice of euthanasia in some cases, and the alleged cultural bias
against disabled or dying individuals that sees their lives as not worth
living. These are standard arguments against opening the door even a
crack to euthanasia, restated here with considerable force. In the
course of raising these objections to physician-assisted suicide, Smith
attempts to answer the common claims that euthanasia promotes
individual freedom and autonomy. In his calculus, the risks of mistake,
abuse, and malice in the practice of euthanasia outweigh any potential
benefits. "Legalizing killing by doctors could even become a way for a
few very unscrupulous doctors to cover up their malpractice," Smith
claims at one point (Smith, p. 190). Forced Exit concludes with a plea
for providing better care and more compassion for the dying and
disabled. Hospice and pain-management are Smith's answers to calls
for death with dignity. In his brief final paragraph, Smith writes: "The
two paths that lie before us, the death culture or the struggle toward a
truly caring community, lead to dramatically different futures. The
choice is ours. So will be the society we create" (Smith, p. 316). Forced
Exit is one long polemic against physician-assisted suicide, medical
euthanasia, and the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment, yet it

23. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
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relies almost exclusively on slippery-slope reasoning. To accept his
conclusion, one must accept his reasoning - that physician-assisted
suicide, once legal, will snowball.
III. GLUCKSBERG AND QUILL
Perhaps because of their scope or purpose, neither book offers a
sustained analysis of the Supreme Court's 1997 Glucksberg and Quill
decisions or their impact on the euthanasia movement in the United
States. By their terms, those decisions should not end the debate over
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia and this alone could justify
Dowbiggin and Smith in ignoring their impact on that debate.2 4 To the
contrary, the Court purports simply to shift the debate from federal
courts into legislative chambers and the public square.2 5 For a topic
like euthanasia, which potentially impacts all Americans, I find this
healthy - and generally agree with the Court here. Nevertheless, I
believe that the decisions have profoundly impacted the policy debate
- perhaps more than the justices expected. Although all nine justices
agreed that states could constitutionally outlaw physician-assisted
suicide, they differed somewhat in their reasoning.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the two opinions of the
Court (one in Glucksberg and the other in Quill) in which five of the
nine justices joined. In upholding the Washington statute in
Glucksberg, he wrote, "[T]he question before us is whether the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right
to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so. "26 To answer this question, the Chief Justice adopted what he
described as the "established method of substantive-due-process
analysis,"27 which begins with the principle "that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.' "28 In the course of his subsequent review of the relevant
history and tradition, he concluded that to find such a right to assisted
suicide, "we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and
practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every
State."29 So stated, such a finding would fly in the face of the nation's

24. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
25. See, e.g., id.

at 735;

26. Id.

at

723.

27. Id.

at

720.

28. Id.

at

720-21.

29. Id.

at

723.

id.

at

U.S. 702, 787-88 (1997).

736 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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history and tradition. That, he suggested, is not the Court's role in a
democratic society.30
In his separate opinion upholding the New York statute, the Chief
Justice rejected the corollary equal-protection argument embraced by
the appellate court in Quill. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection does not require a state, simply because it allows terminally
ill persons on life support to die by having their physicians discontinue
life-sustaining treatment, to also allow terminally ill patients not on
life support to die by having their physicians supply life-ending
treatment.31 The two classes are not equivalent. Rehnquist reasoned:
This conclusion depends on the submission that ending or refusing
lifesaving medical treatment "is nothing more nor less than assisted
suicide." Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction between
assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction
widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our
legal traditions, is both important and logical; it is certainly rational.32

In both opinions, the Chief Justice described legitimate
governmental interests served by outlawing physician-assisted suicide
and distinguishing between what he characterized as "letting a patient
die and making that patient die."33 As he summarized them, those
interests include "prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life;
preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role as their patients'
healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and
psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a
possible slide towards euthanasia."3 4 Yet the Court did not purport to
see those interests as so compelling or certain as to bar states from
legalizing physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, the Chief Justice noted
"We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various
interests,"35 and appended a concluding observation: "Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a
democratic society."36 Indeed, as suggested by the Chief Justice's
earlier comment about the absence of a historical tradition for
physician-assisted suicide in the United States, this debate is largely a

30.

Id.

at 719, 735.

31. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997).
32.

Id.

at 800-01 (citing Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 7 16, 729 (1996)).

33. Vacca, 521 U.S. at 807; see also id. at 806-09 (discussing the governmental interests
served by outlawing physician-assisted suicide); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-36 (same).
34.

Vacca, 521 U.S. at 808-09.

35.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.

36.

Id.
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new one in our country. For him, this makes it all the more
appropriate for legislative rather than judicial resolution at this time.
Although they concurred in the judgment upholding these two
state laws against assisted suicide, five of the Court's more moderate
or liberal justices filed or joined separate opinions expressing their
views on the limits of state power to ban physician aid in dying. For
example, in their concurring opinions, Justices Stephen Breyer and
Sandra Day O'Connor stressed that the availability of palliative care
weighed heavily in their decisions to reject the claimed right to
physician-assisted suicide.37 "That is because, in my view, the
avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would have
to constitute an essential part of any successful claim and because, as
Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force a dying
person to undergo that kind of pain," Breyer wrote.38 "Medical
technology, we are repeatedly told, makes the administration of pain
relieving drugs sufficient, except for a very few individuals for whom
the ineffectiveness of pain control medicines can mean not pain, but
the need for sedation which can end in a coma," he added.39 Given
such pain-control options, O'Connor wrote in her opinion, "the State's
interests in protecting those who are not truly competent or facing
imminent death, or those whose decisions to hasten death would not
truly be voluntary, are sufficiently weighty to justify a prohibition
against physician-assisted suicide." 4° For these justices, this societal
interest in protecting these large classes of vulnerable patients
outweighed the individual interests of the few competent, terminally
ill patients who might voluntarily decide to hasten death. As
O'Connor stated, "The difficulty in defining terminal illness and the
risk that a dying patient's request for assistance in ending his or her
life might not be truly voluntary justifies the prohibitions on assisted
suicide we uphold here." 41
Although agreeing that the "potential harms [associated with the
practice of physician-assisted suicide] are sufficient to support the
State's general public policy against assisted suicide,"42 Justice John
Paul Stevens carried the concern about unmanageable pain a step
further, and expanded it to include suffering generally. 43 "Encouraging
the development and ensuring the availability of adequate pain
37.

Id. at 791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 736-38

38.

Id.

(O'Connor, J., concurring).

at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring).

39. Id. at 791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
joined O'Connor's opinion.
40.

Id.

at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

41.

Id.

at 738 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

42.

Id.

at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring).

43.

Id.

at 746-48 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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treatment is of utmost importance; palliative care, however, cannot
alleviate all pain and suffering," he noted in his concurring opinion. 4 4
"An individual adequately informed of the care alternatives thus
might make a rational choice for assisted suicide. For such an
individual, the State's interest in preventing potential abuse and
mistake is only minimally implicated," Stevens asserted. 4 5 Such an
individual might possess a constitutionally recognizable right to
assisted suicide, he suggested, though not necessarily one that would
overturn general state laws against assisted suicide.46
Justice David Souter placed even stronger qualifications on his
concurrence in upholding the assisted-suicide statutes. "The patients
here sought not only an end to pain (which they might have had,
although perhaps at the price of stupor) but an end to their short
remaining lives with a dignity that they believed would be denied them
by po�erful pain medication, as well as by their consciousness of
dependency and helplessness as they approached death," he wrote.47
"In my judgment, the importance of the individual interest here . . .
cannot be gainsaid."48 Yet he concluded that, at least for now, it was
outweighed by the state's interests in "protecting life generally,
discouraging suicide even if knowing and voluntary, and protecting
terminally ill patients from involuntary suicide and euthanasia, both
voluntary and nonvoluntary."49 In Souter's opinion, "The case for the
slippery slope is fairly made out here . . . because there is a plausible
case that the right claimed would not be readily containable." The
case is only plausible, he stressed, and opined that the evidence on this
point from "the Dutch experience" was mixed. 50 Souter concluded,
"The day may come when we can say with some assurance which side
is right, but for now it is the substantiality of the factual disagreement,
and the alternatives for resolving it, that matter. They are, for me,
dispositive of the due process claim at this time."51
Such concerns and qualifications led the concurring justices to
amplify the Chief Justice's call for state legislatures to address the
issue.52 In an opinion joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, O'Connor wrote:

44.

Id.

at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring).

45. Id.

at

748 (Stevens, J., concurring).

46.

at

749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Id.

47. Id.

at 779 (Souter, J., concurring).

48. Id.

at

49. Id.

(citations omitted).

782 (Souter, J., concurring).

50. Id.

at

785-86 (Souter, J., concurring).

5 1. Id.

at

786 (Souter, J., concurring).

52. Id.

at

735.
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Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family

member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic

process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of
terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end
their suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who might
seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.53

In his opinion, Stevens added, "There remains room for vigorous
debate about the outcome of particular cases that are not necessarily
resolved by the opinions announced today."54 For his part, Souter all
but demanded legislative "experimentation" with "an emerging issue
like assisted suicide. "55 Although conceding that the judiciary should
"stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration" of the
issue, he warned, "I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim
[of a right to physician-assisted suicide] should not be recognized."56
IV. CONCLUSION: DEATH AFTER GLUCKSBERG AND QUILL
Taken together, these various opinions by the justices in

Glucksberg and Quill suggest that, far from resolving the issue of

euthanasia, the Supreme Court rulings should simply have opened a
new, and probably more intense, phase of the public-policy debate
over physician-assisted suicide and medical euthanasia. That has not
happened. The national conversation on these issues has been muted
since the Supreme Court spoke. There have been only two voter
initiatives or referendums on physician-assisted suicide since 1997, one
in Michigan and another in Maine. Both lost without generating much
national attention <smith, p. 171). In A Merciful End, Dowbiggin
characterized them as "demoralizing defeats for right-to-die
proponents" <nowbiggin, p. xviii.>· In his concurring opinion in
Glucksberg, Justice Souter suggested that in-depth analysis of "the
Dutch experience" with medical euthanasia might resolve the U.S.
public-policy debate over the issue, but leading researchers continue
to disagree over the lessons learned from that experience.57 In their
books, both Dowbiggin and Smith report that, in all too many cases,
Dutch physicians violate the law by euthanizing patients without their
consent (Dowbiggin, p. 169; Smith, pp. 114-20).

53. Id.

at

737 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

54. Id. at 752 (Stevens, J., concurring).
55. Id.

at

789 (Souter, J., concurring).

56. Id.
57. Compare ROBERT POOL, NEGOTIATING A GOOD DEATH: EUTHANASIA IN THE
NETHERLANDS (2000) (favorable), with HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH:
DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND ASSISTED SUICIDE (1998) (unfavorable).
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Souter concluded his concurring opinion by urging more state
legislatures to experiment with legalizing physician-assisted suicide,58
but this too has not happened. Since voter passage of Oregon's Death
With Dignity Act, no state has legalized physician-assisted suicide and
three states have enacted specific prohibitions against assisted suicide
(Smith, p. 171, 265). Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its rulings
in Glucksberg and Quill, the Florida Supreme Court refused to find a
right to physician-assisted suicide under its state constitution.59 The
Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion under its state
constitution in 2001.60 Jack Kevorkian's renegade experiment in
physician-assisted suicide and medical euthanasia ended in 1999 with
his conviction of a second-degree charge in a euthanasia case
(Dowbiggin, p. xi). Since 2001, the Bush Administration has
attempted, so far without success, to halt Oregon's experiment with
physician-assisted suicide by claiming that it violated the federal
Controlled Substances Act (Smith, p. 276).
As the only place in the United States where physicians can legally
assist patients in committing suicide, Oregon has quietly proceeded
with its experiment in doctor-aided death. Sixteen persons died by
physician-assisted suicide in Oregon during 1998, the first year it was
legal. The number rose to twenty-seven during each of the following
two years, dropped to twenty-one in 2001, then rose to thirty-eight in
2002, and forty-two in 2003.61 In any given year, about two-thirds of
the patients who request and receive a prescription for lethal
medication actually use the drugs.62 In reporting the higher figures for
2002, an article in the state's largest newspaper noted: "Assisted
suicide accounts for a tiny fraction of deaths in Oregon - about one
in 1,000. The total remains lower than proponents expected and
opponents feared in 1988 when Oregon became the only state to
legalize physician-assisted suicide."63 In contrast, the rate of death by
physician-assisted suicide or medical euthanasia is 100-times higher in
the Netherlands (See Smith, p. 119). People using the Oregon law were
mostly older state residents with cancer or Lou Gehrig's disease. Most

58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (describing such "experimentation" as "entirely proper"
and "highly desirable").
59. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
60. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001)
61. Don Colburn, Assisted Suicide Numbers Surge, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar.
6, 2003, at Al (providing statistics for 1998 to 2002); John Schwartz & James Estrin, Jn
Oregon, Choosing Death Over Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at Fl (providing statistics
for 2003 and on percentage of patients taking the drugs).
62. Schwartz & Estrin,

supra note 61,

at Fl.

63. Colburn, supra note 61, at Al. Similarly, in reporting the figures for 2003, the New
article commented, "Perhaps the most surprising thing to emerge from Oregon
is how rarely the law has actually been used." Schwartz & Estrin, supra note 61, at Fl.
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were white and had medical insurance.6 4 "It is almost as if Oregon
were the calm center in the heart of the storm over this issue,"
commented Dr. Joanne Lynn, a national expert on end-of-life medical
care who has staunchly opposed legalizing euthanasia.65
In Forced Exit, Smith paints as bleak a picture as possible of the
Oregon experiment, yet even he concedes that "it is hard to tell" how
the law is working.66 If anything, the Oregon experience should lessen
fears that physician-assisted suicide, once legalized, will expand
beyond bounds. The lesson from Dowbiggin's history and the
warnings in Smith's account notwithstanding, perhaps the procedure
can be confined to consenting, terminally-ill adults. That has been the
case in Oregon where, with few exceptions, the precise limits imposed
by the Death with Dignity Act have been followed.67
In his 1997 introduction to the first edition of Forced Exit, written
before the Supreme Court decisions in Glucksberg and Quill, Smith
foresaw a steady spread of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in
The United States - he called it a "moral trickle-down" <smith, p.
xxvP· In his 2003 introduction to the revised edition of the same book,
he admitted that "it hasn't happened yet" (Smith, p. xii). "Why this
turnaround when assisted suicide threatened to sweep the country?"
he asked in the revised edition (Smith, p. 171>· The Supreme Court's
decision in Glucksberg and Vacco must have been a critical factor.
Smith characterizes them as "devastating losses for the assisted suicide
movement" (Smith, p. 170). Dowbiggin suggests as much and speaks of
the present "impasse" that the euthanasia movement has reached
(Dowbiggin, pp. 173-76). Neither author elaborates on this point, and
surely there were other factors involved. Yet just when the euthanasia
movement appeared on the verge of a breakthrough following the
passage of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act and victories in two
federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court rulings stopped it cold,
perhaps because they were unanimous, with forceful opinions from
justices representing various judicial philosophies. Even though the
justices expressed the hope and expectation that their constitutional
ruling would not resolve the legal and political debate over physician
assisted suicide, it seems to have done just that - at least in the short
run. The credence given by all the justices to slippery-slope arguments
against legalizing physician-assisted suicide may have given many
people pause. De Tocqueville would have been impressed with the
64. Colburn,
2003, at C12.

65. Don Colburn,
2001, at Al.
66.

Smith,

note 61, at All;

Facing Death, THE OREGONIAN

(Portland), Mar. 7,

Assisted Suicide Rate is Steady, THE OREGONIAN

(Portland), Feb. 7,

supra

pp.154-61 (quote at 154).

67. The exceptions are so rare that even alleged ones make national news. See, e.g., John
Schwartz, Questions on Safeguards in Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A22.
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deference paid to judicial opinion, but perhaps not surprised.
Remember his observation about statutes losing moral force in the
United States once a judge finds them unconstitutional. Glucksberg
and Quill offer the parallel instance of disputed statutes against
assisting suicide gaining moral force when the Supreme Court upheld
them as constitutional.

